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THE SOUL OF A NATION: 
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AFTER 9/11
In the immediate wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans 
suddenly found themselves faced with an unexpected choice between radically dif-
ferent perspectives on the proper place of religion in modern Western society. The 
alternative perspectives were not new. But the urgency with which they were felt, 
and the intensity with which they were articulated, marked a dramatic departure. 
Coming at a moment when Americans had been gradually rethinking many settled 
precedents regarding religion and public life, it seemed to give a sharper edge to 
the questions being asked.
For many observers, there was only one logical conclusion to be drawn from 
these horrifyingly destructive acts, perpetrated by fanatically committed adherents 
to a militant and demanding form of Islam: that all religions, and particularly the 
great monotheisms, constitute an ever-present menace to the peace, order, and lib-
erty of Western civil life. Far from embracing the growing sentiment that the Unit-
ed States government should be willing to grant religion a greater role in public life, 
such observers took 9/11 as clear evidence of just how serious a mistake this would 
be. The events of 9/11 seemed to confirm their contention that religion is incor-
rigibly toxic, and that it breeds irrationality, demonization of others, irreconcilable 
division, and implacable conflict. If we learned nothing else from 9/11, in this view, 
we should at least have relearned the hard lessons that the West learned in its own 
bloody religious wars at the dawn of the modern age. The essential character of 
the modern West, and its greatest achievement, is its tolerant secularism. To settle 
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for anything less is to court disaster. If there still has to be a vestigial presence of 
religion here and there in the world, let it be kept private and kept on a short leash. 
Is not Islamist terror the ultimate example of a “faith-based initiative”? How many 
more examples do we need?
To be sure, most of those who put forward this position were predisposed to 
do so. They found in 9/11 a pretext for restating settled views, rather than a cata-
lyst for forming fresh ones. More importantly, though, theirs was far from being 
the only response to 9/11, and nowhere near being the dominant one. Many other 
Americans had a completely opposite response, feeling that such a heinous and 
frighteningly nihilistic act, so far beyond the usual psychological categories, could 
only be explained by resort to an older, pre-secular vocabulary, one that included 
the numinous concept of “evil.” There were earnest post-9/11 efforts, such as the 
philosopher Susan Neiman’s thoughtful book Evil in Modern Thought (2002), to 
appropriate the concept for secular use, independent of its religious roots. But such 
efforts have been largely unconvincing. If 9/11 was taken by some as an indict-
ment of the religious mind’s fanatical tendencies, it was taken with equal justifica-
tion by others as an illustration of the secular mind’s explanatory poverty. If there 
was incorrigible fault to be found, it was less in the structure of the world’s great 
monotheisms than in the labyrinth of the human heart – a fault about which those 
religions, particularly Christianity, have always had a great deal to say.
Even among those willing to invoke the concept of evil in its proper re-
ligious habitat, however, there was disagreement. A handful of prominent evan-
gelical Christian leaders, notably Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, were unable to 
resist comparing the falling towers of lower Manhattan to the Biblical towers of 
Babel, and saw in the 9/11 attacks God’s judgment upon the moral and social evils 
of contemporary America, and the withdrawal of His favor and protection. In that 
sense, they were the mirror opposites of their foes, seizing on 9/11 as a pretext for 
re-proclaiming the toxicity of American secularism. But their view was not typical, 
and, in fact, was so widely regarded as reckless and ill-considered that they seem to 
have permanently damaged their credibility.
The more common public reaction was something much simpler and more 
primal. Millions of Americans went to church, searching there for reassurance, for 
comfort, for solace, for strength, and for some semblance of redemptive meaning in 
the act of sharing their grief and confusion in the presence of the transcendent. Both 
inside and outside the churches, in windows and on labels, American flags were 
suddenly everywhere in evidence, and the strains of “God Bless America” seemed 
everywhere to be wafting through the air, along with other patriotic songs that 
praised America while soliciting the blessings of the Deity. The pure secularists and 
the pure religionists were the exceptions in this phenomenon. For most Americans, 
it was unthinkable that the comforts of their religious heritage and the well-being 
of their nation could be in any fundamental way at odds with one another. Hence it 
can be said that 9/11 has produced a great revitalization, for a time, of the American 
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civil religion, that strain of American piety that bestows many of the elements of 
religious sentiment and faith upon the fundamental political and social institutions 
of the United States.
***
Such a tendency to conflate the realms of the religious and the political has hardly 
been unique to American life and history. Indeed, the achievement of a stable rela-
tionship between the two constitutes one of the perennial tasks of social existence. 
But in the West, the immense historical influence of Christianity has had a lot to 
say about the particular way the two have interacted over the centuries. From its 
inception, the Christian faith insisted upon separating the claims of Caesar and the 
claims of God – recognizing the legitimacy of both, though placing loyalty to God 
above loyalty to the state. The Christian was to be in the world but not of the world, 
living as a responsible and law-abiding citizen in the City of Man while reserving 
his ultimate loyalty for the City of God. Such a separation and hierarchy of loyal-
ties, which sundered the unity that was characteristic of the classical world, had 
the effect of marking out a distinctively secular realm, although at the same time 
confining its claims.
For Americans, this dualism has often manifested itself as an even more 
decisive commitment to something called “the separation of Church and State,” 
a slogan that is taken by many to be the cardinal principle governing American pol-
itics and religion. Yet the persistence of an energetic American civil religion, and of 
other instances in which the boundaries between the two becomes blurred, suggests 
that the matter is not nearly so simple as that. There is, and always has been, consid-
erable room in the American experiment for the conjunction of religion and state. 
This is a proposition that committed religious believers and committed secularists 
alike find deeply worrisome – and understandably so, since it carries with it the 
risk that each of the respective realms can be contaminated by the presence of its 
opposite number. But it is futile to imagine that the proper boundaries between re-
ligion and politics can be fixed once and for all, in all times and cultures, separated 
by an abstract fiat. Instead, their relationship evolves out of a process of constant 
negotiation and renegotiation, responsive to the changing needs of the culture and 
the moment.
We seem to be going through just such a process at present, as the renego-
tiation of boundaries continues fast and furious. Consider, for example, the case 
now before the Supreme Courtinvolving whether the words “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Or 
the many similar cases, most notoriously that of Judge Roy Moore in Alabama, 
involving the display of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and other public 
buildings. Or the work of the President’s faith-based initiative, which extends an 
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effort begun in the Clinton Administration to end discrimination against religious 
organizations that contract to provide public services. Or the contested status of the 
institution of marriage, which has always been both a religious and a civil institu-
tion, a process that could lead not only to same-sex marriages but to the legalization 
of polygamous and other nontraditional marital unions. A multitude of issues are at 
play, and it is hard to predict what the results will look like when the dust settles, 
if it ever does.
Experience suggests, however, that we would be well advised to steer be-
tween two equally dangerous extremes, which can serve as negative landmarks 
in our deliberations about the proper relationship between American religion and 
the American nation-state. First, we should avoid total identification of the two, 
which would in practice likely mean the complete domination of one by the other 
– a theocratic or ideological totalitarianism in which religious believers completely 
subordinated themselves to the apparatus of the state, or vice versa. But second, 
and equally important, we should not aspire to a total segregation of the two, which 
would in practice bring about unhealthy estrangement between and among Ameri-
cans, leading in turn to extreme forms of sectarianism, otherworldliness, cultural 
separatism, and gnosticism, a state of affairs in which religious believers will re-
gard the state with pure antagonism, or vice versa. Religion and the nation are 
inevitably entwined, and some degree of entwining is a good thing. After all, the 
self-regulative pluralism of American culture cannot work without the ballast of 
certain elements of deep commonality. But just how much, and when and why, are 
hard questions to answer categorically.
***
Perhaps we can shed further light on the matter by taking a closer look at the con-
cept of “civil religion.” This is admittedly very much a scholar’s term, rather than 
a term arising out of general parlance, and its use seems to be restricted mainly to 
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and historians and the like, even 
though it describes a phenomenon that has existed ever since the first organized 
human communities. It is also a somewhat imprecise term, which can mean several 
things at once. Civil religion is a means of investing a particular set of political/
social arrangements with an aura of the sacred, thereby elevating their stature and 
enhancing their stability. It can serve as a point of reference for the shared faith of 
the entire state or nation, focusing on the most generalized and widely held beliefs 
about the history and destiny of that state or nation. As such, it provides much of the 
social glue that binds together a society through well-established symbols, rituals, 
celebrations, places, and values, supplying the society with an overarching sense 
of spiritual unity – a sacred canopy, in Peter Berger’s words – and a focal point for 
shared memories of struggle and survival. Although it borrows extensively from 
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the society’s dominant religious tradition, it is not itself a highly particularized 
religion, but instead a somewhat more blandly inclusive one, into whose highly 
general stories and propositions those of various faiths can read and project what 
they wish. It is, so to speak, a highest common denominator.
The phenomenon of civil religion extends back at least to classical antiqu-
ity, to the local gods of the Greek city-state, the civil theology of Plato, and to the 
Romans’ state cult, which made the emperor into an object of worship himself. But 
the term itself appears in recognizably modern form in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Social Contract (1762), Book 4, Chapter 8, where it was put forward as a means of 
cementing the people’s allegiances to their polity. Rousseau recognized the historic 
role of religious sentiment in underwriting the legitimacy of regimes and strengthe-
ning the citizen’s bonds to the state and their willingness to sacrifice for the general 
good. He deplored the influence of Christianity in this regard, however, precisely 
because of the way that it divided citizens’ loyalties, causing them to neglect worl-
dly concerns in favor of spiritual ones. Christians made poor soldiers, because they 
were more willing to die than to fight. Rousseau’s solution was the self-conscious 
replacement of Christianity with
a purely civil profession of faith, of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly 
as religious dogma, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen and 
faithful subject.
Since it was impossible to have a cohesive civil government without some 
kind of religion, and since Christianity is inherently counterproductive or subver-
sive to sound civil government, he thought the state should impose its own custom-
tailored religion, which provides a frankly utilitarian function. That civil religion 
should be kept as simple as possible, with only a few, mainly positive beliefs: the 
existence and power of God, the afterlife, the reality of reward or punishment, etc., 
and only one negative dogma, the proscribing of intolerance. Citizens would still 
be permitted to have their own peculiar beliefs regarding metaphysical things, so 
long as such opinions were of no worldly consequence. But “whosoever dares to 
say, ‘Outside the Church no salvation,’” Rousseau sternly declared, “ought to be 
driven from the State.”
Needless to say, such a nakedly manipulative approach to the problem of 
socially binding beliefs, and such dismissiveness toward the commanding truths 
of Christianity and other older faiths,has not attracted universal approval, in Rous-
seau’s day or since. Nor has the general conception of civil religion. It is not hard 
to see why. One of the most powerful and enduring critiques came some two centu-
ries later, from the pen of the American scholar Will Herberg, whose classic study 
Protestant Catholic Jew (1955) concluded with a searing indictment of what he 
called the “civic” religion of “Americanism.” Such religion had lost every smidgen 
of its prophetic edge; instead, it had become “the sanctification of the society and 
152 WILFRED M. MCCLAY
culture of which it is the reflection.” The Jewish and Christian traditions had “al-
ways regarded such religion as incurable idolatrous,” because it “validates culture 
and society, without in any sense bringing them under judgment.” Such religion no 
longer comes to prod the indolent, afflict the comfortable, and hold the mirror up to 
our sinful and corrupt ways. Instead, it “comes to serve as a spiritual reinforcement 
of national self-righteousness.” It was the handmaiden of national arrogance and 
moral complacency.
But civil religion also had its defenders. One of them, the sociologist Rob-
ert N. Bellah, put the term on the intellectual map, arguing in an influential 1967 
article called Civil Religion in America that the complaint of Herberg and others 
about this generalized and self-celebratory religion of The American Way of Life 
was not the whole story. The American civil religion was, he asserted, something 
far deeper and more worthy of respectful study, a body of symbols and beliefs 
that was not merely a watered down Christianity, but possessed a “seriousness and 
integrity” of its own. Beginning with an examination of references to God in John 
F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, Bellah detected in the American civil-religious 
tradition a durable and morally challenging theme: “the obligation, both collective 
and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.” Hence Bellah took a much more 
positive view of that tradition, though not denying its potential pitfalls. Against the 
critics, he argued that
the civil religion at its best is a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent reli-
gious reality as seen in or ... revealed through the experience of the American people.
It provides a higher standard against which the nation could be held account-
able.
***
For Bellah and others, the deepest source of the American civil religion is the Puri-
tan-derived notion of America as a New Israel, a covenanted people with a divine 
mandate to restore the purity of early apostolic church, and thus serve as a godly 
model for the restoration of the world. John Winthrop’s famous 1630 sermon to 
his fellow settlers of Massachusetts Bay, in which he envisioned their “plantation” 
as “city upon a hill,” is the locus classicus for this idea of American chosenness. 
It was only natural that inhabitants with such a strong sense of historical destiny 
would eventually come to see themselves, and their nation, as collective bearers of 
a world-historical mission. What is more surprising, however, was how persistent 
that self-understanding of America as the Redeemer Nation would prove to be, and 
how easily it incorporated the secular ideas of the Declaration of Independence and 
the language of liberty into its portfolio. The same mix of convictions can be found 
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animating the rhetoric of the American Revolution, the vision of Manifest Destiny, 
the crusading sentiments of antebellum abolitionists, the benevolent imperialism of 
fin-de-siècle apostles of Christian civilization, and the fervent idealism of President 
Woodrow Wilson at the time of the First World War. No one expressed the idea more 
directly, however, than Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, who told the United 
States Senate, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, that “God has marked us 
as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world.”
The American civil religion also has its sacred scriptures, such as the May-
flower Compact, the Declaration, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Gettysburg 
Address, and the Pledge of Allegiance. It has its great narratives of struggle, from 
the suffering of George Washington’s troops at Valley Forge to the gritty valor of 
Jeremiah Denton in Hanoi. It has its special ceremonial and memorial occasions, 
such as the Fourth of July, Veterans Day, Memorial Day, Thanksgiving Day, and 
Martin Luther King Day. It has its temples and shrines and holy sites, such as the 
Lincoln Memorial and other monuments, the National Mall, the Capitol, the White 
House, Arlington National Cemetery, the great Civil War battlefields, and great nat-
ural landmarks such as the Grand Canyon. It has its sacred objects, notably the na-
tional flag. It has its organizations, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Ameri-
can Legion, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Boy Scouts. And it 
has its dramatis personae, chief among them being its military heroes and the long 
succession of Presidents. Its telltale marks can be found in the frequent resort to the 
imagery of the Bible and reference to God and Providence in speeches and public 
documents, and in the inclusion of God’s name in the national motto (“In God We 
Trust”) on all currency, in the patriotic songs found in most church hymnals.
The references to God have always been nonspecific, however. From the 
very beginnings of the nation’s history, the nation’s civil-religious discourse was 
carefully calibrated to provide a meeting ground for both the Christian and Enlight-
enment elements in the thought of the Revolutionary generation. One can see this 
nonspecificity, for example, in the many references to the Deity in the presidential 
oratory of George Washington, which are still cited approvingly today as civil-
religious texts. But there is no denying that civil-religious references to God have 
evolved and broadened even further since the Founding, from generic Protestant to 
Protestant-Catholic to Judeo-Christian to, in much of President George W. Bush’s 
rhetoric, Abrahamic and even monotheistic in general. But what has not changed 
is the fact that such references still always convey a strong sense of God’s provi-
dence, His blessing on the land, and of the Nation’s consequent responsibility to 
serve as a light unto the nations.
Every President feels obliged to embrace these sentiments and expresses 
them in oratory. Some are more enthusiastic than others. As political scientist Hugh 
Heclo has recently demonstrated, Ronald Reagan’s oratory was especially rich in 
such references. But President Bush surpassed even that standard, and put forward 
the civil-religious vision of America with the greatest energy of any President since 
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Woodrow Wilson. He echoed those sentiments in 2003 when he declared, speak-
ing to the National Endowment for Democracy, that the advance of freedom is the 
calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the 
Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the 
service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that 
liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence 
come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom – the 
freedom we prize – is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all man-
kind… And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we can be certain the 
Author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom. In another speech, to 
the Coast Guard Academy, he declared that “the advance of freedom” is “a calling 
we follow,” precisely because “the self-evident truths of the American founding” 
are “true for all.” Anyone who thinks this aspect of the American civil religion has 
died out has simply not been paying attention.
***
Precisely because President Bush was, arguably, the most evangelical President 
in American history, his use of such oratory both inspired and discomfited many 
– sometimes even the same people. For Herberg’s general critique of civil religion 
still has considerable potency. It is clear, given the force-field of tensions within 
which civil religion exists, that it has an inherently problematic relationship to the 
Christian faith, or to any other serious religious tradition. At its best, it provides 
a secular grounding for that faith, one that makes political institutions more respon-
sive to calls for self-examination and repentance, as well as exertion and sacrifice 
for the common good. At its worst, it can provide divine warrant to unscrupulous 
acts, cheapen religious language, turn clergy into robed flunkies of the state and 
the culture, and bring the simulacrum of religious awe into places where it doesn’t 
belong.
Indeed, if one were writing this account before 9/11, one might emphasize 
the extent to which there has been a growing disenchantment with American civil 
religion, particularly in the wake of the Vietnam conflict. Robert Bellah himself 
has largely withdrawn from association with the idea, and even seems to be slightly 
embarrassed by the fact that his considerable scholarly reputation is so tied up in 
this slight disreputable concept. For many serious and committed Christians, there 
has been a growing sense that the American civil religion has become a pernicious 
idol, antithetical to the practice of their faith. This has been true not only of, say, 
liberal Christians who have opposed American foreign policy in Asia and Latin 
America and changes in American welfare policy, but also of highly conservative 
Christians who have grown startlingly disaffected over their inability to change set-
tled policies on social issues such as abortion. On the religious right as well as the 
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religious left, the question has been posed, with growing frequency, of the compat-
ibility of Christianity with America.
Such multipolar disaffection found expression, for example, in the remark-
ably wide influence of an 1989 book called Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian 
Colony, by theologians Stanley Hauerwas and Wiliam Willimon. As sophisticated 
liberal Methodists writing in a broadly Anabaptist tradition, the authors articulated 
a starkly separationist position that was strikingly consonant with the current mood 
of many in the Christian community at the end of the 1980s. The title came from 
Philippians 3:20: “We are a commonwealth [or colony] of heaven,” and the authors 
urged that churches think of themselves as “colonies in the midst of an alien cul-
ture,” whose members should think of themselves as “resident aliens” in that cul-
ture – in it, but not of it. The culture-war aspects of the Clinton impeachment only 
accentuated this sense among conservative Christians that the civil government had 
nothing to do with their faith, and the President of the United States, the high priest 
of the civil religion, was just another unredeemed guy, indeed rather worse than 
the norm. The combination of Clinton’s moral lapses with his conspicuous Bible-
carrying and church-going seemed proof positive that the American civil religion 
was not only false but genuinely pernicious. With the controversial election of 2000 
leaving the nation so bitterly divided, with the eventual victor seemingly tainted 
forever, the prospects for the civil religion could hardly have looked bleaker. Just 
before the 9/11 attacks occurred, Time magazine anointed Stanley Hauerwas as 
America’s leading theologian, a potent sign of the state of things, ante bellum.
***
The attacks of 9/11 changed all of that decisively, though how permanently is quite 
another question. The initial reactions of some religious conservatives to the at-
tacks, seeing them as a divine retribution for national sins, were reflexive and un-
guarded expressions of the “resident alien” sentiment. But they were out of phase 
with the resurgence of civil religion, and their comments viewed, fairly or unfairly, 
as a kind of national desecration.
Indeed, it is remarkable how quickly the ailing civil religion sprang back to 
new life, expressed especially through a multitude of impromptu church services 
held all over the country, an instinctive melding of the religious and the civil. Per-
haps the most important of these was the service held at the National Cathedral on 
September 14, 2001, observing a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, where 
President Bush spoke to virtually the entire assembled community of Washington 
officialdom – Congressmen, judges, generals, cabinet officials, and the like – and 
delivered a speech that touched, with remarkable grace and poise, all the classic 
civil-religious bases. America had a “responsibility to history” to answer these at-
tacks. God is present in these events, even though His “signs are not always the 
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ones we look for” and his purposes not always our own.” But our prayers are nev-
ertheless heard, and He watches over us, and will strengthen us for the mission the 
lies ahead. And, directly invoking Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, he concluded:
As we have been assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, 
nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God’s love. May 
He bless the souls of the departed. May He comfort our own. And may He always guide our coun-
try. God bless America.
It is interesting to note that Robert Bellah himself found the speech highly 
objectionable. It was, he told a reporter from the Washington Post, “stunningly in-
appropriate,” little more than a “war talk” designed to whip up bellicose sentiments. 
“What,” he complained, “was it doing there?” With all due respect to Professor 
Bellah, though, one wonders if he was watching the same speech and reading the 
same text as the rest of us. The speech was much more concerned with the nation’s 
collective grief, with the need to remember the dead and celebrate the heroism of 
those workers who sacrificed their own lives to save others, to acknowledge and 
mourn the nation’s wounds. And as for his expressions of national resolve, this 
was entirely appropriate, and would in fact have been an enormous omission, had 
it been left out. As the historian Mark Silk observed, defending Bush’s speech, 
“if civil religion is about anything, it’s about war and those who die in it.” Would 
Bellah have been equally critical of Abraham Lincoln’s resolve, in the Gettysburg 
Address, that “these dead shall not have died in vain” and that Americans should 
remain “dedicated to the great task remaining before us.” Then again, perhaps he 
would have been more charitable to the speech had it been given by a Democratic 
president. But his visceral reaction gave clear indication that the civil religion of 
America was still on probation in some quarters, and that binding up the nation’s 
wounds would be a far easier task than binding up the civil faith.
***
Even today, years after the attacks, a substantial flow of visitors continues to make 
pilgrimages to the former World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan, now known 
forever as Ground Zero. It remains an intensely moving experience, even with all 
the wreckage cleared away and countless pieces of residual evidence removed or 
cleaned up. One still encounters open and intense expressions of grief and rage 
and incomprehension, in the other visitors and perhaps in oneself. It has become 
a shrine, a holy place, and has thereby become assimilated into the American civil 
religion. Yet the single most moving sight, the most powerful and immediately 
understandable symbol, is the famous cross-shaped girders that were pulled out of 
the wreckage, and have been raised as a cross. What, one wonders, does it mean 
to the people viewing it, many of whom, one presumes, are not Christians and not 
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even Americans? Was it a piece of nationalist kitsch, or a sentimental relic? Or was 
it a powerful witness to the redemptive value of suffering – and, thereby, a signpost 
pointing toward the core of the Christian story? Or did it subordinate the Christian 
story to the American one, and thus traduce its Christian meaning?
Much of what is good about civil religion, and much of what is dangerous 
about it, even at its best, is summed up by the ambiguity of this image. Yet 9/11 
reminded us of something that the best social scientists already knew – that the im-
pulse to create and live inside of a civil religion is an irrepressible human impulse, 
and that this is just as true in the age of the nation-state. There can be better or 
worse ways of approaching it, but the need for it is not to be denied. As the younger 
Robert Bellah seems to have understood, the state itself is something more than just 
a secular institution. Because it must sometimes call upon its citizens for acts of 
sacrifice and self-overcoming, and not only in acts of war, it must be able to draw 
on spiritual resources, deep attachments, reverent memories of the past, and visions 
of the direction of history to do its appropriate work. Ernest Renan put it well in his 
justly celebrated essay, What is a Nation?:
The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, 
and devotion ... To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present, to 
have performed great deeds together, to which to perform still more – these are the essential condi-
tions for being a people ... A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of 
the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future.
Without such feelings, no nation can long endure, let alone wage a long and 
difficult struggle. Nothing in this formulation precludes the need for the civil reli-
gion to contain an element of transcendental accountability, which should serve as 
a check on nationalistic excesses, rather than an enabler of them. Also, it should be 
stressed that civil religion can be a source of peaceable cohesion among different 
groups of different faiths, allowing them to bring some of their moral sensibility 
into public life and contribute to the making of a better society without causing 
conflict.
At the same time, one should be able to understand the disgust felt by many 
serious Christians and other believers toward civil religion. Even at best, the pro-
ponent of civil religion seems to be arguing for a system of beliefs based on its 
consequences rather than its truth. Yet by the same token, responsible critics of civil 
religion have to be willing to offer a serious and persuasive vision of what things 
could be like in this country, or any country, without it. I doubt that they can. The 
only real alternatives are the extremes of fusion or alienation, extreme theocracy 
or extreme sectarianism. Such experiences would, at the very least, be without any 
precedent in American history.
Indeed, there may be more to be feared from the remaining weakness of 
the civil religion than from its resurgent strength. Despite much public worrying 
about President Bush’s easy resort to God-talk, his oratory lies well within the 
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well-established historical pattern of American civil-religious discourse. Instead, it 
is the unremittently negative reaction against it in some quarters that seems to have 
far less precedent. In addition, it is far too early to say that a settled alienation of 
religious believers from the American nation-state is no longer a possibility. There 
is a genuine danger that changes such as that envisioned in the Pledge of Allegiance 
controversy, or radical changes in the definition of marriage, or an unraveling of all 
traditional bioethical restraints, may produce a situation in which large numbers of 
conservative Christians will conclude that their Christian beliefs no longer permit 
them to be loyal and obedient American citizens. A civil religion that proposed 
to incorporate such changes would no longer be able to command their loyalty. 
Instead of being an instrument of national unity, it would become an instrument of 
national division.
In other words, the danger facing us in the years to come may be less from 
the triumphalism of civil religion, though that is always a danger, than from the 
very real possibility that traditional religious believers will not see their values 
reflected adequately in the national creeds and institutions and such, and will with-
draw their affect as a result, with highly damaging consequences. It is a danger to 
which the current American president, Barack Obama, who has made effective 
use of civil-religious images and tropes, seems well attuned. And it’s a danger that 
even a committed secularist such as John Dewey could see clearly, which made 
him plead with his fellow intellectuals not to mock church-going evangelicals, and 
made him look for a “common faith” that would embrace the emotive component 
of religion without its divisive assertions.
Dewey’s solution was inadequate, but his formulation of the problem was 
not far off base. In a pluralistic society, religious believers and nonbelievers alike 
need ways to live together, and to do so, they need a second language of piety, 
one that extends their other commitments without undermining them. Yet it seems 
needlessly revolutionary, not to mention futile, to invent a common faith when one 
is already readily at hand, already fully invested with the very elements that Renan 
saw as requisite. To be sure, there is always something secondary and unsatisfying, 
and even inherently dangerous, about a civil religion. But the alternative is perilous 
too. It is surely a first rule of politics, as of life, that one must learn to work with the 
materials one has at hand.
